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Abstract 
 
Assuming that a person subject to a search and seizure of his or her 
computer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
computer, and thus a warrant is required, should the warrant outline a “search 
strategy”? Or should comprehensive computer searches be permitted? In other 
words, how should the particularity requirement be applied to computer 
searches? Correspondingly, what can a forensic examiner do under a warrant 
while collecting potential evidence from a computer? 
Current computer forensic methodology calls for seizing the entire 
computer, making a mirror image of the hard drive, and then forensically 
examining the contents of the drive off-site. While examining the contents of 
the drive, all user (i.e., non-system) files must be inspected, regardless of their 
file extensions and potential relevance to the case. 
There are various justifications for this methodology. First, it is accepted 
that the computer must be seized and examined off-site because the forensic 
examinations of the sizable hard drives of today take too long on-site and 
require specialized computer equipment. Accepted practice also requires that 
the forensic examiner make a mirror image of the hard drive to avoid changing 
the contents of the original hard drive. In addition, the forensic examiner must 
look at every user file because file extensions can be misleading and relevant 
evidence could be found even in files that are seemingly unrelated to the current 
investigation. If the examiner finds of evidence of, for example, child 
pornography while searching for evidence of fraud, the examiner must then get 
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 a second warrant to continue to search for more child pornography. 
Thus, a warrant not only permits a search, it also serves to limit that 
search. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “shall issue particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.” This 
is accomplished through the particularity requirement: a warrant must be 
sufficiently precise so that the officer executing the warrant can with reasonable 
effort ascertain and identify the place intended. Furthermore, the description 
must leave nothing to the discretion of the officers. There are exceptions, such 
as good faith and plain view, but the officer cannot search in a “breadbox for an 
elephant.” 
In the physical world, those standards are easily applied. A warrant is 
issued describing in detail the place to be searched. For instance, a search 
warrant may authorize a police officer to search for controlled substances in a 
person’s home at a certain time. An officer may not seize the entire contents of 
the home, carry them away and then search them at his leisure. His search is 
limited by the contents of the warrant. 
In the computer context, however, the particularity requirement has 
seemingly been abandoned. Search warrants for computers could be likened to 
the “Writs of Assistance” that the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to eliminate. Under current practice, computers, 
which can store the same amount of data found in a full library, are seized, 
taken off site and then rummaged through by a forensic examiner. On-site 
searches for particular computer files are too “difficult” and “time consuming.” 
The needs of law enforcement – and not Fourth Amendment rights – control the 
content of warrants. 
This state of affairs has been accepted (or at least tolerated) because 
computer searches are seen as “special.”  The computer world is unlike the 
physical one. As a result, courts have struggled to apply Fourth Amendment law 
that was developed from cases in the physical world (e.g., what is “plain view” 
in cyberspace?). One solution is to create new Fourth Amendment rules for 
computer searches. Alternatively, law enforcement could use methods that 
comport with the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps the details of the accepted trilogy 
of acquisition, authentication and analysis can be reworked as new technologies 
become available. 
This paper will discuss computer forensics, search strategies and the 
particularity requirement. Part II will be an overview of computer technology. 
Part III will examine accepted computer forensic methodologies and principles 
and their justifications. Part IV will discuss the Fourth Amendment, warrants 
and the particularity requirement in the context of computer searches. 
Analogous physical world searches will be discussed. Part V will outline 
alternative methods for the forensic examination of computers. In addition to 
the accepted practice of off-site comprehensive computer searches, various 
methods, tools and technology are, or could be, available to computer forensic 
examiners. Instead of adapting warrants to the needs of law enforcement, 
perhaps those alternatives will allow law enforcement to undertake computer 
searches, while still preserving Fourth Amendment rights. 
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 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE TECHNOLOGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY passim (Laura J. Moriarty & David J. Carter, eds., 
2005) [hereinafter “CRIMINAL JUSTICE”] (noting the increase in computer-based and computer-related crimes in the 
past few decades).  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal investigations increasingly involve evidence from personal computers. 1 
Searching and seizing personal computers present problems that traditional, physical world 
searches do not.2 Unlike in the physical world, where an officer can go to a physical location, 
search for a tangible item, and then possibly seize it, law enforcement is faced with many 
variables when searching computers. Computer data is fragile and easily destroyed. The amount 
of data found on a computer is complex and voluminous. Computer files may have misleading 
names or may be hidden. 
As a result, warrants to search computers have difficulty “particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”3 The particularity requirement 
prevents law enforcement from executing “general warrants” that permit “exploratory 
rummaging” through a person’s belongings in search of evidence of a crime.4 But the complexity 
of computers makes it difficult for law enforcement to determine beforehand what hardware 
should be seized and what files should be searched. The solution frequently comes in the form of 
a “search strategy”: the affidavit lists the specific hardware to be seized and searched and 
explains the techniques that will be used to search only for the specific files related to the 
investigation, and not every file on the computer.5 
When searching the computer, a forensic examiner uses the search strategy as a guide. 
Even so, a forensic examiner will often search files that are unrelated to the investigation. For 
example, if the search strategy allows the examiner to look for files containing the word “drug”, 
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 the examiner may find files related to legal prescription drugs –  not just controlled substances. 
Furthermore, the forensic examiner may find evidence of other crimes besides the one under 
investigation. For example, the examiner may be searching for evidence of fraud, and while 
doing so, find images of child pornography. Thus, the search of a computer is not only controlled 
by the warrant, but also by other practical and technical considerations.  
This paper will discuss computer forensics, search strategies and the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Assuming that a person who is subjected to the search 
and seizure of his or her computer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
computer, and thus a warrant is required, what type of “search strategy” should the warrant 
outline? How comprehensive should a computer search be? In other words, how should the 
particularity requirement be applied to computer searches? Correspondingly, what should a 
warrant authorize a forensic examiner to do while collecting potential evidence from a computer? 
Part II will be an overview of relevant computer technology. Computer technology 
encompasses many devices, but this part will focus on the personal computer. Part III will 
discuss accepted computer forensic methodologies and principles and their justifications. Part IV 
will discuss the Fourth Amendment, warrants, and the particularity requirement in the context of 
computer searches. Analogous physical world searches will also be discussed. Part V will outline 
alternative methods for the forensic examination of computers. This part will also critically 
examine the justifications for accepted computer forensic methodologies and principles. In 
addition to accepted computer forensic practices, various methods, tools and technology are, or 
could be, available to computer forensic examiners. 
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
 
 a. Architecture 
 
Digital evidence can come from a variety of sources, such as computer programs, 
computer networks and other electronic devices such as cell phones, beepers and personal digital 
assistants.6 Although there are many possible sources of digital evidence, the most common type 
of digital evidence used in criminal courts is from personal computers (“PC”s).7 
PCs are composed of many parts, including input and output devices, memory, storage 
devices, central processing units (“CPU”s) and data buses.8 Examples of input devices are mice 
and keyboards.9 Monitors and printers are output devices.10 Memory is where programs and data 
are stored temporarily while the PC is turned on.11 There are many types of memory within a 
computer, including cache and flash memory, but the most familiar type is Random Access 
Memory (“RAM”).12 Storage devices are where programs and data are stored permanently.13 
Hard disks, floppy disks, CDs and DVDs are examples of storage devices.14 The data on storage 
devices is relatively static compared to the data that passes through memory.15 The CPU is the 
“brain” of the computer: it executes programs stored in memory by fetching, examining and 
executing instructions.16 Finally, the data bus is a set of wires that connects all the computer parts 
and transmits data from one part to another.17  
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 The forensic examination of a computer centers on storage devices, because storage 
devices retain data even when the computer is turned off.18  The data in other parts of the 
computer is lost when the computer is powered off.19 Of the various types of storage devices, 
hard drives are usually the richest source of data from computers.20 There are a number of 
different hard drive technologies, such as Integrated Drive Electronics (“IDE”) and Small 
Computer System Interface (“SCSI”), but all have a disk controller, which is a computer chip 
that controls the drive.21 Also, regardless of type, hard drives contain one or more platters with a 
magnetic coating.22 If there is more than one platter, the platters are stacked vertically.23 Each 
platter spins under a disk head, which floats over the platter and reads and writes data to it.24 
To write to the platter, negative and positive current is passed through the disk head, 
which then magnetizes the platter that is spinning underneath it.25 To read from the platter, the 
positive or negative current from the disk is induced in the disk head.26 Each positive or negative 
impulse represents a bit.27 The bit is the smallest storage unit in a computer.28 
b. Computer Data 
 
A bit may contain a one or a zero.29 Eight bits make a byte.30 Although stored on hard 
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 drives as bytes, computer data is manipulated and transmitted by a computer in the form of serial 
bit streams.31 A serial bit stream is a string of bits (e.g., 00011001). The conversion from bytes to 
a serial bit stream and vice versa is done by the hard drive controller.32 
Appended to the end of a serial bit stream is an error correcting code (“ECC”).33 An ECC 
is used to verify that the serial bit stream has not been corrupted by, for instance, a voltage 
spike.34 An ECC is calculated using one of any number of algorithms.35 The algorithm uses the 
ones and zeroes in the data bits to compute the ECC’s value.36 That computation can then be 
done again later.37 The computed ECC can then be compared to the stored ECC to verify the 
integrity of the data.38 Various parts of the computer, including the hard drive controller, can 
compute an ECC.39 
Computer users do not see bits, bytes, strings of ones and zeros or ECCs. Computer users 
see files. The operating system –for instance, Windows XP – organizes the underlying ones and 
zeroes into the files and folders that are familiar to computer users through a graphic user 
interface. Many of the files found on computers are a part of the operating system, and thus 
much of the data found on hard drives is a part of the operating system.40 
c. File Systems 
 
The operating system determines how files are organized. Each operating system has its 
own way of organizing files, and the particular type of organization is known as the file system. 
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 For example, Windows XP uses the NT File System (“NTFS”), Macintosh uses the Macintosh 
Hierarchical Filesystem (“HFS”), and UNIX uses various file systems, including the UNIX File 
System (“UFS”).41 The file system keeps track of where data is located on a hard drive.42 It does 
so through a system-created file known as the file allocation table (“FAT”).43 The FAT could be 
likened to a library card catalog: just as a card catalog tells a person where to find a book in the 
library, the FAT tells the operating system where to find a file. When a file is deleted, the FAT 
entry is deleted, but the underlying data is left on the hard drive until it is overwritten by other 
data. In other words, hitting the “delete” key, without more, will merely change the status of the 
file in the FAT. This is analogous to someone removing a card from the card catalog but leaving 
the book on the shelf: the book could still be found but not by looking in the card catalog.44 
The file system also controls file extensions. File extensions, such as “doc”, “jpg”, and 
“htm”, are one to three character identifiers that appear after the file name.45 File extensions 
inform the user and the operating system of the file’s type. The file extension can be changed by 
a user, without changing the actual type of file.46 For instance, “doc” can be changed to “jpg”, 
but the file will still be a Microsoft Word document and not an image document, because the file 
itself contains an internal header that specifies the file type.47 
 
III. ACCEPTED COMPUTER FORENSIC PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The field of computer forensics covers the principles and methodologies used to collect, 
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 preserve and examine evidence from computers.48 Most often this evidence comes from a storage 
device, such as a hard drive, because the data found on a storage device is relatively static 
compared to the volatile data that passes through the other parts of a PC.49 The established 
methodologies used to obtain evidence from storage devices fall into three broad stages: 
acquisition, authentication and analysis.50 
a. Acquisition 
 
Assuming there is legal authority for the search, 51  the forensic examiner must first 
prepare by having the proper equipment, such as computers and software used to acquire data, in 
place.52 The forensic examiner must also be prepared to document all aspects of the search: who 
collected the evidence, when it was collected, from where it was collected and how it was 
collected.53 
After those preliminaries, the forensic examiner must acquire the potential computer 
evidence. At this stage, there are four possible ways to do so: (1) search the computer and print 
hard copies of particular files on-site; (2) search the computer and make an electronic copy of 
particular files on-site; (3) create a duplicate electronic copy of the entire storage device on-site 
for later off-site examination; or (4) seize the computer hardware, remove it from the premises 
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 and review its contents off-site.54 
Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages. Printing hard copies of particular 
files on-site is quick and simple.55 Even a police officer with limited computer knowledge can do 
it. Printing is also the least disruptive method.56 If the PC is part of a private computer network 
or is needed to conduct legitimate business purposes, printing will not disturb those activities. 
Moreover, if part of a private network, the system administrator or owner may be able to assist in 
the collection of data from the PC.57 
But simply printing files may cause “substantial loss of information, including file date 
and time stamps, file path name, ‘undo’ history, comment fields and more.”58 This information is 
known as metadata.59 Metadata is data about the data and is either stored internally within a file 
or in other operating system files.60 Metadata can yield relevant evidence. For example, it can be 
used to determine who created a file and when and where the user did so.61 If an officer simply 
prints a file, the metadata associated with that file will not be examined. 
The second method of acquiring computer data –  searching a computer on-site and 
making electronic copies of particular files –  captures the metadata that is stored internally 
within files. Like printing, this method is simple and causes minimal disruption.62 However, this 
method is disfavored because, by only copying some files and not all of them, potential evidence 
may be overlooked or may not be readily apparent to the examiner on-site.63 Furthermore, there 
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 is a risk that the “system has been modified to conceal or destroy evidence,”64 and potential 
evidence is not readily apparent to the examiner. In addition, on-site searches are time-
consuming: “[g]iven that personal computers sold in the year 2002 usually can store the 
equivalent of thirty million pages of information and networks can store hundreds of times that 
(and these capacities double nearly every year), it may be practically impossible for agents to 
search quickly through a computer for specific data, a particular file or a broad set of files while 
on-site.”65 Finally, in copying (or printing) individual files on-site, data may be unintentionally 
altered or destroyed.66 Such actions may change, for instance, the time-date stamp that indicates 
when a file was last accessed. Also, just turning on a PC may change files. For example, during 
the start-up process of the Windows NT operating system, five hundred files are altered.67 
The third method of acquiring data, creating a duplicate electronic copy of the entire 
storage device on-site for off-site examination, overcomes some of the limitations of the first two 
methods. Copying an entire storage device prevents changes or damage to the original.68 Also, 
taking the copy off-site allows for painstaking examination in a controlled environment. 69 
Moreover, all data is copied, including metadata, system-created files, and deleted files. “Given 
the risks in collecting only a few files, in most cases, it is advisable to acquire the full contents of 
the disk because digital investigators rarely know exactly what a disk contains.” 70  
All data on a storage device is captured through a procedure known as disk imaging.71 
Disk imaging uses software programs to copy a storage device at the bit level, and each bit on 
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 the original is reproduced in the copy.72 The resulting “image” of the original is known as a bit 
stream copy.73 A bit stream copy is an exact duplicate of the original storage device.74 This 
differs from a logical copy, in which a copy is made of the files that are accessible to a user 
through the operating system.75 
An example helps to illustrate the difference. Consider a file on a hard drive. Because of 
the manner in which data is written to the hard drive, rarely will one file be stored intact in one 
place on a hard drive. The file is usually broken into parts, and each part may be on a different 
part of the hard drive. This is known as file fragmentation.76 Together, the parts form the single 
file that a user sees on screen through the operating system. At the lowest level, the individual 
parts of the file are comprised of bits.77 Because a file is often fragmented, the bits may be on 
different parts of the drive. When a logical copy is made, the structure of files and folders as 
viewed through the operating system is copied, but the underlying parts may be copied to 
different locations and in a different order. Thus, the organization of the bits on the copy may be 
different from the original. However, a bit stream copy reproduces the storage device at the bit 
level. The underlying structure and order of bits is copied exactly from the original to the 
reproduction.  
Because disk imaging copies all bits, the bit stream copy contains all data on the hard 
drive –  including deleted data. A logical copy will not reproduce deleted files, because the 
deleted files are not accessible to the operating system.78 The operating system is cognizant of 
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 only the files found in the FAT.79 If a file has been deleted, it is no longer listed in the FAT, 
although the underlying data may still be stored on the hard drive.80 Disk imaging captures the 
underlying data because it does not rely on the FAT in making a copy. 
In addition to disk imaging, the third method of acquiring data employs read-only tools 
called write-blockers.81 Write-blockers are either hardware devices or software programs that 
prevent any data from being added, deleted or altered on the original storage device.82 Write-
blockers are found to be necessary because a “major aspect of preserving digital evidence is 
collecting it in a way that does not alter it.”83 
Although the third method has advantages over the first two, it is deprecated because 
imaging a storage device on-site may be time consuming.84  More importantly, the original 
evidence is left behind when the examiner takes the copy off-site for examination: “[f]ield 
acquisition is not the preferred method, because failure to maintain control of the evidence drive 
can also lead to problems in establishing the authenticity of the evidence in court.”85 One way 
around this difficulty is to make a mirror image of the hard drive, replace the original with the 
mirror image, and then take the original off-site. 
However, the universally accepted solution to those limitations is the fourth method of 
data acquisition: seizing all computer hardware, removing it from the premises and reviewing its 
contents off-site.86  This method makes the hardware available for others to examine at a later 
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 date.87   Further, the actual collection of the hardware, known colloquially as “tagging and 
bagging”, takes little technical expertise.88  And like the third method, the hardware can later be 
examined in a controlled environment.89 
The off-site examination of hardware shares other similarities with the third method. The 
term “hardware” encompasses the physical components of the PC –  individually and as a whole. 
Thus, a hard drive is a piece of hardware. Consequently, an off-site examination of PC hardware 
employs both disk imaging and write-blocking.90 Because of its similarities to the third method, 
the fourth method also overcomes the difficulties of the first two methods of data acquisition. For 
example, all data, including metadata and deleted files, may be examined. 
All authorities agree that the fourth method is a “best practice” and is preferred over the 
other three.91  In essence, this amounts to taking the entire PC off-site, making a bit stream copy 
of the hard drive and then forensically examining the contents of the copy. 
b. Authentication 
 
After the hardware has been acquired, but before the data on the storage device can be 
analyzed, the data must be authenticated.92  Authentication involves comparing the original data 
to the copy and verifying that the two are the same.93 
Data is authenticated through software that uses a hashing algorithm. 94   A hashing 
algorithm takes a set of data as input and produces a distinct numerical output known as a hash 
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 value.95 Hash values are analogized to fingerprints, because the probability of any two different 
sets of data having the same hash value is extremely low.96 Different data sets produce different 
hash values, even if the data differs by only one bit,97 but an exact copy will have the same hash 
value as the original.98 
A hash algorithm is a mathematical function. A mathematical function takes a value as an 
input and produces a unique output value.99 The formal definition of a function is: “[a] function f 
is a rule that assigns to each element x in a set A exactly one element, called f(x), in a set B.”100 In 
general, a function is represented by y = f(x), where y is the output, x is the input, and f is the 
function.101 For example, y = f(x) = x + 1 is a function. When x = 2, f takes 2 as an input and the 
value of the output y is 3 = f(2) = 2 + 1. It is helpful to think of a function as a machine that 
implements a rule: when a value is input to the machine, the machine outputs a value according 
to a rule.102 In the above example, the rule is “add 1 to whatever number is input.” 
Similarly, a hash algorithm is a function that takes a value as an input and produces a 
unique output value.103  The inputs are computer data and the outputs are unique numerical 
values. 104  The function itself is implemented through computer code within a computer 
program.105 There are a number of hashing algorithms in use today, such as: Message Digest 
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 Algorithm 5 (“MD5”), Secure Hash Algorithm (“SHA”), HAVAL and SNEFRU.106 The most 
commonly used algorithms are MD5 and SHA.107 Each algorithm uses a different set of rules to 
produce a unique output value for a given input.108 
Although computer users see images, words and decimal numbers on a computer screen 
through the graphic user interface, on an electronic level computers manipulate and store such 
data in the form of serial bit streams (e.g., 10011001).109 Thus, hash algorithm input values are in 
the form of serial bit streams. Output values are in the hexadecimal numerical format, whereby 
eight binary characters are represented by a combination of two hexadecimal characters.110 
Hexadecimal is a base-sixteen number system and uses the digits 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, 
C, D, E and F.111 For example, 3C is a hexadecimal number and it is equal to 00111100 binary 
and 60 decimal.112 
The previous example shows how a decimal number is represented in binary and in hex. 
A hashing algorithm does not simply convert from one number system to another however. A 
hashing algorithm implements a rule that computes a unique hex value for a given string of bits. 
For instance, when the text sentence ‘The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog’ is input into 
the MD5 hashing algorithm, the result is the thirty-two digit hexadecimal number ‘9E 10 7D 9D 
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 37 2B B6 82 6B D8 1D 35 42 A4 19 D6’.113 In mathematical notation, that example becomes: 
 
f(x) = y = MD5(The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog) = 
9E107D9D372BB6826BD81D3542A419D6, where f = MD5, x = The quick brown fox 
jumps over the lazy dog, and y = 9E107D9D372BB6826BD81D3542A419D6. 
 
If the input is changed by one character, the output is completely different: 
MD5(The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dogs) = 3EE6F92B7CDDC3F50B7D 
2DDD145B018B. 
 
And if a different hashing algorithm is used, SHA-1 (a version of SHA), the output is a 
forty-digit hexadecimal number: 
SHA-1(The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog) = 2FD4E1C67A2D28FCED84 
9EE1BB76E7391B93EB12. 
 
The examples show a sample text string and an actual hash value for that string. However, 
a hashing algorithm is used in computer forensics to compute the hash value for a much larger 
set of input data –  generally the entire set of bits found on a hard drive. 
Hashing algorithms and hash values are used at various stages of the forensic 
examination of data. First, before anything else is done with the original hard drive, the hash 
value of its data is calculated.114 Also, a hash value for the analysis disk – the hard disk to which 
the original will be copied – is calculated.115 After copying the original hard drive to the analysis 
disk, the hash value of the analysis disk then should be calculated.116 The hash values of the 
original and of the copy are then compared. If they match, then the analysis drive is a “true and 
authentic copy of the original evidence.”117 
The hash values of individual files can also be calculated. Instead of inputting all bits on 
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 the hard drive, only the bits associated with an individual file are input to a hash algorithm. This 
can be used to verify that an individual file has not changed. This can also be used to match 
identical files –  even if the files have different names.118 In addition, a forensic examiner can use 
hash values to sort unknown files from common software programs and system files. 119 
Individual file hashing is also used by the FBI’s “Innocent Images National Initiative,” which 
compares the hash values of evidence files with those of known child pornographic images.120 
Although hash values are touted as “unique” 121  and have been compared to 
“fingerprints,”122 researchers have created different data sets with identical MD5 and SHA hash 
values.123 When a hash algorithm produces the same hash value for two different data sets, the 
result is known as a collision.124 Researchers have found MD5 collisions in fifteen minutes on a 
simple laptop computer.125 Even so, MD5 and SHA continue to be used, but in time they will 
likely be replaced by more robust hashing algorithms.126 
Hashing algorithms are employed because they help to establish that the evidence 
ultimately used in court is reliable.127 Hash values are used to demonstrate that the results of the 
forensic analysis are an authentic product of the evidence seized.128 However, a hash value alone 
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 does not demonstrate that the evidence is reliable, because data could be altered before a hash 
value has been calculated.129 As with other types of evidence, “the trustworthiness of digital 
evidence comes down to the trustworthiness of the individual who collected it.”130 Even if a 
hashing algorithm is used, the proponent must prove that the evidence presented in court is 
unaltered. 
c. Analysis 
 
Once the hardware has been acquired and the data has been authenticated, the next stage 
in the forensic examination of a PC is to analyze the data. The analysis is done using a copy of 
the data and not the original data and storage device.131  The “analysis should preserve the 
integrity of the digital evidence and should be repeatable and free from distortion or bias.”132  
The first step in the analysis stage is typically data reduction.133 This is necessary because 
today’s hard drives can contain a large volume of data. For instance, a forty gigabyte hard drive 
can contain the equivalent of twenty million typewritten pages.134 Much of the data on a hard 
drive is part of the operating system or of known computer programs.135 A forensic examiner can 
filter out such data using file hashing: the hash values of files on the evidence drive are 
compared with known hash values and matching files are not analyzed.136 
After the data reduction step, the nature and extent of analyses of storage devices vary 
greatly, depending on the crime under investigation.137 By first determining the types of digital 
                                                 
129
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 220. 
130
 Id. 
131
 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 7, at 308-14; CASEY, supra note 6, at 226-27. 
132
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 229. 
133
 See Id. 
134
 Luehr, supra note 119, at 15. 
135
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 229. 
136
 See supra Part III.b. 
137
 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 7, at 315; CASEY, supra note 6, at 229. The nature and extent of the analysis is also 
 evidence that are likely to be associated with the crime under investigation, the forensic 
examiner can more quickly locate relevant evidence.138 For example, a search for evidence of 
online auction fraud may first analyze email and image files. In a computer intrusion case the 
forensic examiner may search for user-created computer source code and computer programs. In 
narcotics cases, for example, the examiner may be looking for address books and financial 
records.139 
However, not all searches are for user-created files, such as documents, email messages 
or images. Some searches are for system-created data, such as user names, temporary files and 
printer spool history. 140  Other searches are for file system information, such as directory 
structure, file attributes, file names, date and time stamps, file sizes and file locations.141 Such 
data can answer “who”, “what”, “when”, and “where” questions and can show intent or 
knowledge. For example, a set of child pornography images neatly organized by a user could be 
used to show that the possession of those images was not merely the result of something that 
“just popped up on the screen”, but was, in fact, intentional. 
In addition to searching for active files, a forensic examiner can search for deleted data. 
When a file’s FAT entry is deleted through the operating system, the underlying data remains on 
the hard drive until it is overwritten by other data.142 The deletion of a FAT entry causes the 
operating system to mark the parts of the hard drive that the file was using as unused (or 
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 “unallocated”).143 The data in those unallocated parts remains on the hard drive and can be 
recovered by a forensic examiner using software tools called hex editors.144 Hex editors allow a 
forensic examiner to access data at the bit level.145 Hex editors are named after the manner in 
which data is displayed within them. Because strings of ones and zeroes are difficult to read, hex 
editors display data in the hexadecimal numerical format.146 
Hex editors can also be used to recover partially overwritten files. If the operating system 
reuses an unallocated part of the hard drive, the data from the new file might only partially 
overwrite data from a previous file.147 The portion of the hard drive that is not overwritten by the 
new data is known as “slack space.”148 It is relatively easy to recover data that is not overwritten 
at all and remains intact in unallocated space; however, data that has been partially overwritten 
and that is found in slack space may require the forensic examiner to recreate the file by grafting 
parts of similar files onto the file fragments.149 This may give the examiner a sense of the 
original file, but the grafted file is not the original.150 
Alternatively, a forensic examiner can compare the file fragments in slack space to a 
known complete version of the file.151 Depending on how many parts of the two data sets match, 
the examiner may conclude that the two files are the same.152 In such cases, the examiner would 
need to support such a conclusion with statistics.153 In particular, the examiner would need to 
show that there is an infinitesimal probability of the same two combinations of bits occurring by 
                                                 
143
 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 7, at 324. 
144
 Id. at 327. 
145
 Id. at 328. 
146
 Id.; see supra Part III.b. for an explanation of hexadecimal numbers. 
147
 TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 324. 
148
 Id. at 324-25. 
149
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 237. 
150
 Id. 
151
 TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 329. 
152
 Id. 
153
 Id. 
 chance.154 
Even if not deleted, some data may be password-protected, encrypted or compressed, 
which may indicate an attempt to conceal the data and may be used to show possession or 
ownership.155 Nonetheless, such files may be analyzed with the help of other evidence. For 
example, the password may be found written down near the computer or in unallocated or slack 
space. 156  In addition, keyboard logging software may be used to collect a computer user’s 
keystrokes –  including passwords.157 
Besides keyboard logging software, other software programs can recover a user password, 
or decrypt or decompress a file.158 In fact, there are a variety of forensic software tools available 
for the analysis of a PC.159  For instance, disk imaging, write-blocking, hashing and hex editing 
are accomplished through computer software.160 Some software programs are all-in-one tools 
that have all those functions in addition to other searching, analyzing and reporting capabilities. 
The three most common all-in-one tools currently in use are EnCase, Forensic Toolkit and 
Ilook.161 
The use of forensic software tools is encouraged instead of, for example, using an 
operating system’s search function to find files by keyword or file type.162 A search by keyword 
is a search based upon a particular word or phrase, and a search by file type looks for certain 
                                                 
154
 Id. 
155
 FORENSIC EXAMINATION, supra note 50, at 17; CASEY, supra note 6, at 238-39. 
156
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 239. 
157
 See John Schwartz, Compressed Data; Password Protection with Prison Stripes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001 
(describing sophisticated keyboard logging software developed by the FBI); see also United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 572 (D. N.J. 2001) (holding that use of keyboard logging software was not an unlawful general warrant in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
158
 E.g., “Password Recovery Tool Kit.”  FORENSIC EXAMINATION, supra note 50, at 27; CASEY, supra note 6, at 239. 
159
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 261-64, 294-301, 326-27; CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 250; TAYLOR, supra note 
7, at 329-31. 
160
 See supra Part III.a. 
161
 CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 250. 
162
 CASEY, supra note 6, at 230. 
 types of files. For instance, in a search for child pornography, the keyword “Lolita” or the file 
extension “jpg” could be used. However, conducting such searches through the operating system 
is discouraged, because misleading file names or types may be used, and relevant evidence could 
be found even in files that are seemingly unrelated to the current investigation.163 Such problems 
are avoided through the use of forensic software tools, because they circumvent the operating 
system and work directly with the data found on the hard drive.164 Thus, even if a file extension 
has been changed, a tool such as EnCase can determine the true file type by interrogating the file 
header, for example.165 
While searching for data, the forensic examiner is interpreting and analyzing the data “to 
determine their significance to the case.”166 In some cases, such as child pornography possession 
cases, the analysis may be relatively straightforward: the examiner may search for and find 
numerous illegal images on a person’s PC. In other cases, however, a more comprehensive 
analysis may be required, one that involves investigative reconstruction. Investigative 
reconstruction offers “a more complete picture of a crime” by answering such questions as: what 
happened, who is responsible, and when, where, how and why the event or events occurred.167 
Investigative reconstruction in computer forensics falls into six broad categories. First, 
data hiding analysis is used to determine if a user intentionally concealed data on a PC.168 This is 
useful to “indicate knowledge, ownership, or intent.” 169  Second, ownership and possession 
analysis is similar to data hiding analysis in that it seeks to identify the person “who created, 
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 modified, or accessed a file.”170 Third, application and file analysis provides insight into the 
system’s operation “and the knowledge of the user.”171 For example, if files are stored in non-
default locations and in an organized manner, this could be used to show knowledge or intent. 
Fourth, functional analysis assesses how a computer functioned.172 It answers such questions as: 
was a computer capable of performing the actions in question and were the actions intentional or 
the result of a system malfunction?173 Fifth, relational analysis seeks to “identify relationships 
between suspects, victim, and crime scene.” 174  It can help find other suspects and find 
connections between various data.175 Finally, temporal analysis is used to determine “the time 
and sequence of events.”176 Time-date stamp information is useful because it can be used to 
associate computer usage to a person or persons at the time the events occurred.177 It can also be 
used to create a timeline, which “can help an investigator identify patterns and gaps” in computer 
activity.178 
Some of those types of analyses overlap, of course. For instance, while doing a temporal 
analysis, the forensic examiner must be aware that the user may have intentionally altered the 
system clock, thus causing time-date stamps to be inaccurate.179 The examiner should note the 
difference between the actual and system times and make the appropriate calculations.180 The 
examiner could also look to other sources, such as time-date stamps placed on email messages by 
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 other computers, to determine the actual time of the events.181  Hence, in doing a temporal 
analysis, the examiner is also doing a data hiding analysis. 
Throughout the forensic examination of a PC, from acquisition to the final stages of 
analysis, the examiner must document all steps, findings and conclusions. 182  Such 
“documentation should be contemporaneous with the examination….”183 This is a prerequisite to 
creating a final written report and in preparation for possible expert testimony.184 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ACCEPTED COMPUTER FORENSIC PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODOLOGIES 
 
The forensic examination of a computer in criminal investigations must be considered 
within the legal framework of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has stated that “the 
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the 
writs of assistance and their memories of the general warrants formerly in use in England.”185 In 
eighteenth century England, general warrants authorized petty officials to search for seditious 
papers.186 Because such papers were not easily identified before the search, general warrants 
were not specific and gave the officials wide discretion in arresting suspects, searching homes 
and seizing papers.187  Similarly, at about the same time in the colonies, writs of assistance 
authorized local officials – “assistants” of the Crown – to forcibly enter and search a colonist’s 
home for smuggled goods. 188  General warrants and writs of assistance, issued for the 
convenience of officials, were the “aboriginal subject of the fourth amendment” and were the 
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 evils that the Fourth Amendment was intended to eliminate.189 
a. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, Exceptions, and Analogies 
 
 Of course, over time Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved to include other 
considerations besides the ones contemplated when it was drafted. Today, the touchstone in 
Fourth Amendment analysis is the concept of “reasonable expectation of privacy.” If a person 
has both a subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy in a place, then a warrant is 
required for a state actor to search that place.190 In other words, a search occurs when there is an 
infringement upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a place.191 
 In the case of computers, a person may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
some computer data. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”192 For example, a person may not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in images visible on a computer screen or in data sent over a 
public network, such as the internet. Even if not sent over the internet, a person may not have an 
expectation of privacy in data stored locally or even on a private network. For instance, there is 
probably no reasonable expectation of privacy in email or other data stored on a computer in the 
workplace that is accessible without a password.193 Even if access requires a password, there 
may be no expectation of privacy when the data has been sent across a private network, because 
in so doing, the data has been knowingly exposed to the system administrator.194 Furthermore, if 
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 more than one person has access to data on a computer, then there may be no expectation of 
privacy in that data.195 
However, if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in computer data, then a 
warrant is required for law enforcement to search that data –  unless the search falls within one of 
the exceptions to the warrant requirement. There are a number of recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that may have some application in the computer context, including consent, 
exigent circumstances, good faith and plain view. 
First, if a person consents to the search of his or her computer, then no warrant is required 
for the part of the search that is within the ambit of the consent.196 A search could exceed the 
consent, if, for example, an officer searches a computer’s hard drive when a person has only 
consented to a viewing of what is visible on the computer screen. 197  Second, the exigent 
circumstances exception could have some application in cases where electronic evidence of a 
crime is about to be destroyed by a person.198 In such cases the officer may be justified in seizing 
the computer without a warrant to prevent the destruction of evidence.199 However, the officer 
would nonetheless need a warrant to then search the computer.200 Third, if an officer reasonably 
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 relies on what turns out to be an invalid warrant, the good faith exception applies under federal 
law.201 If an officer does not rely on the precise language of the computer search warrant and 
uses a different search methodology, however, then the officer may not be found to have acted in 
good faith.202 Finally, the plain view exception may justify extending the scope of the search of a 
computer. Some courts have held that if an officer finds evidence of one crime (e.g., child 
pornography) while searching for evidence of another crime (e.g., controlled substances), the 
officer must then get a second warrant to continue searching for items not listed in the warrant.203 
Other courts have held that if an officer inadvertently finds evidence of other crimes while 
searching a computer, then that evidence is considered to be in plain view.204 
In applying the plain view doctrine to digital evidence, courts have analogized computer 
searches to searches of closed containers,205  file cabinets206  and documents.207  Of those, the 
document search analogy is probably the most persuasive. Each collection of bits that makes up a 
computer file is like a single, physical document, and just as a paper document generally 
contains a set of related information, so too does the collection of bits that make up a file. 
Furthermore, analogizing a computer file to a piece of paper is a natural result of how we talk 
about computer files: we commonly speak of computer files as “documents” or “records.”  
Because of the way we talk about computers, it is also tempting to analogize a computer 
to a “container,” which is “any object capable of holding another object.”208 In common parlance, 
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 a file is said to “in” or “on” a computer. Thus it appears that computers are objects that “hold” 
other objects, namely computer data. But a computer does not simply hold data, it is composed 
of data. A given computer is the sum total of the data found on that computer’s storage device. 
Without the data, the computer would do little, if anything, when turned on. The closed container 
analogy is an imperfect one because it conflates two meanings of the word “computer”; it refers 
to both the physical object and the data as a “computer.” For the same reason, the file cabinet 
analogy also fails: a file cabinet holds various documents, but a computer does not simply hold 
files – a computer is composed of those files. If we are being precise, we distinguish between a 
computer qua hardware and a computer qua electronic data. 
There is another reason to reject the container analogy. Closed containers “by their very 
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be 
inferred from their outward appearance.”209 The same cannot be said about a computer: one 
cannot tell its data merely by looking at its hardware. Unlike the contents of a typical closed 
container, such as a fifty-gallon drum, a kit of burglar’s tools or a gun case, the data of a given 
computer is complex and varied.210 An officer could infer that the computer “holds” data just by 
looking at it, but a visual inspection of computer hardware adds nothing to that officer’s 
knowledge of the details of the computer’s possible “contents.” Hence, the outward appearance 
of computer hardware in no way diminishes a person’s expectation of privacy in the data 
contained within that hardware – unlike the outward appearance of the usual closed container.  
In general, if analogies will be used in computer search cases to help extend existing 
Fourth Amendment law to new factual situations, then the “intermingled documents” analogy 
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 will probably be the most helpful.211 Documents requested in a warrant may be intermingled 
with documents that are not within the scope of the warrant. As a result, “[i]n searches for papers, 
it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to 
determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”212 Likewise, 
there may be situations where computer files requested in a warrant may be intermingled with 
other files. In both cases, because such searches present “grave dangers,” “responsible officials, 
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that 
minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”213  
One such way to “take care” is to require a magistrate to intervene where documents 
requested in a warrant are intermingled with irrelevant documents.214 “In the comparatively rare 
instances where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on site, … law 
enforcement officials generally can avoid violating fourth amendment rights by sealing and 
holding the documents pending approval by a magistrate of a further search.”215 In such cases, 
law enforcement could seize all documents but only search those documents authorized by the 
supervising magistrate. This approach could be applied to computer search cases, where it 
appears that the problem of intermingled files that cannot be feasibly sorted on-site is not 
“comparatively rare.”216 
b. The Warrant Requirement 
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 In computer search cases, the forensic examination of a computer by a state actor is 
typically authorized by a valid search warrant.217 To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a 
search warrant must meet three requirements. 
First, the warrant must be based on probable cause that evidence of crime will be found 
in the place to be searched.218 A showing of probable cause establishes a justification for a search. 
Probable cause for a warrant exists if there is a reasonable probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.219 The probable cause standard is a 
“‘practical, nontechnical conception.’”220 “In dealing with probable cause, … as the very name 
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act.”221  
Establishing probable cause in computer cases requires some showing that evidence will 
be found in the computer to be searched. This is not always easy in some computer cases. For 
example, internet service provider records may establish that a certain person sent an email. 
However, such records may not show which computer the person used to do so. Even if the 
person has a PC in his or her home, the email may have been sent from another computer at 
another location.222 A showing that the person sent the email alone may not establish that he or 
she sent it from a particular computer. 
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 In addition to being based on probable cause, a valid warrant must be signed by a neutral 
and detached magistrate who is capable of determining if “probable cause exists for the 
requested” search.223 The magistrate must be neutral and detached because law enforcement is 
engaged “in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”224 and “may lack sufficient 
objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the contemplated action 
against the individual’s interests in protecting his own liberty….”225 
The magistrate need not be an attorney or judge,226  but must have the “capacity to 
determine probable cause.” 227  Thus, the magistrate must have the experience and training 
required to determine if probable cause exists.228 Many aspects of computers are highly technical, 
so it is unclear what level of expertise is required in computer cases to meaningfully assess a 
showing of probable cause.. Given that grand and petit juries are often called upon to assess 
“complex and significant factual data,” an experienced judge most likely has the requisite 
capacity to determine probable cause in computer search cases.229 
Finally, the warrant must describe with sufficient particularity the place to be searched 
and the items to be seized.230 While probable cause establishes justifications for a search, the 
particularity requirement sets limits on a search. Particularity requires that a warrant be 
sufficiently precise so that the officer executing the warrant can “with reasonable effort ascertain 
and identify the place intended.”231 Moreover, “[t]o satisfy the particularity requirement of the 
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 fourth amendment, the warrant must be sufficiently definite to enable the searching officers to 
identify the property authorized to be seized.”232 If it is not possible to describe the object of the 
search in detail beforehand, a search warrant may authorize a search for a class of items. Such 
generic language is permissible “if it particularizes the types of items to be seized….” 233 
However, even if generic, the description must leave nothing to the discretion of the officers.234 
c. The Particularity Requirement in Computer Searches 
 
The particularity requirement was included in the Fourth Amendment as a remedy to the 
general warrants and writs of assistance of the colonial period.235 In light of its history and 
purposes, the particularity requirement is likely the chief problem in searches and seizures 
involving computers, for computer searches “can turn into sweeping examinations of a wide 
array of information.” 236 Law enforcement routinely seizes entire computers and computer hard 
drives, pursuant to computer forensic “best practices.” This effectively sets no limit on the search 
of computers because computers contain a voluminous variety of data –  much of which may be 
personal, private and outside the scope of the investigation. 
In executing a “best practices” computer search warrant, the forensic examiner searching 
a computer may not be able to determine with reasonable effort the place within the computer to 
be searched. Even if a warrant particularly describes the computer and computer data to be 
searched, should the warrant particularly describe where on the computer the data is located? It is 
easy to think of a computer as a single, discrete place to be searched. A laptop is a single item, 
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 and a desktop computer appears to be just a few parts from the exterior. When computer 
hardware itself is contraband, evidence or an instrumentality or fruit of a crime, then there is 
little harm in regarding a single computer as a single item. In such cases, the hardware itself may 
be easily described before the search and identified and seized during.237 But in cases where 
computer hardware is merely the storage device for possible evidence and a warrant is sought to 
search for that data, analogizing a computer to a single place is misleading. Computer storage 
devices do not contain just one place; they hold multifarious data, such as metadata and user and 
system files and folders, in numerous small spaces, including bits and bytes and slack and 
unallocated spaces. 
Given the storage capacity of today’s computers, a warrant that allows the search of an 
entire computer could be compared to a warrant that authorizes the search of a home. In some 
cases, depending on the items sought, the search of an entire home would not be authorized. For 
example, if there is probable cause to believe that there is a stolen television in the home, the 
warrant would not authorize the search of desk drawers.238 Should a computer search warrant 
have similar limitations to comport with the rationale and history of the particularity 
requirement?239 
If relying on a container analogy, then a “best practices” search of every place within a 
computer without further description is probably justified, because an officer with authority to 
search a place for an item has the authority to search any containers or spaces in the place that 
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 are large enough to contain the item.240  “A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to 
the entire area in which the object of the search may be found, and is not limited by the 
possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.”241 
Each place in a computer could be compared to a small space or container that an officer is 
justified in “opening” because it might contain an item sought.242 
However, there are good reasons to reject the closed container analogy and follow an 
intermingled documents analogy instead. 243  Under an intermingled documents analysis, the 
search of an entire computer would, in some cases, require the intervention of a neutral and 
detached magistrate. The magistrate would review the discrete places within a computer to 
determine if a forensic examiner might search those places. This approach has the advantage of 
protecting privacy interests, but the costs are high: the magistrate must have at his or her disposal 
technical expertise to review data, and such a review may introduce inefficiencies into computer 
search cases.  
There is another particularity problem with a “best practices” computer search warrant.  
By allowing the seizure of an entire computer and the search of all data contained therein, such a 
warrant leaves a great deal to the discretion of a forensic examiner. A single computer can store a 
vast amount of information –  much of which may be totally irrelevant to the investigation. From 
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 this arises the question: what data should be searched and what property should be seized? In 
other words, how much discretion should a forensic examiner have in a computer search case? 
Without any further limitations on the search, a warrant that allows the search of “any computers 
and computer media located therein,” for instance, will leave most of the decision on how to 
search to the discretion of the examiner. 
Courts have sought to limit a forensic examiner’s discretion in the search of a computer 
by requiring the inclusion of a “search strategy” in the warrant. 244  A search strategy is a 
recitation of how law enforcement officials will conduct the search of a computer. The inclusion 
of such language is an additional, non-Constitutional element of the particularity requirement.  
The particular manner in which a computer will be searched is included in the warrant or 
affidavit, in addition to the particular description of the place to be searched and the items to be 
seized. Hence, a search strategy not only authorizes the search for particular items, it also limits 
how a forensic examiner may go about searching for those items. For example, a search strategy 
warrant could authorize a forensic examiner to search for possible evidence through the use of 
specific keyword searches.245 In such cases, the warrant or affidavit would describe the particular 
keywords to be used to search for files containing a certain word or file extension.  
Search strategies are not a panacea for the particularity problems of computer searches, 
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 however. An affidavit may contain a search strategy that follows computer forensic “best 
practices” by authorizing an off-site search of all data on a computer’s hard drive. In such cases, 
the search strategy does very little, if anything, to limit law enforcement’s search of the data and 
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. In fact, the Department of Justice 
recommends that all computer search warrant affidavits include a search strategy because 
“explaining the search strategy in the affidavit helps to counter defense counsel motions to 
suppress based on the agents’ alleged ‘flagrant disregard’ of the warrant during the execution of 
the search.”246 Moreover, agents should avoid “articulating an excessively narrow or restrictive 
search strategy” because “defense counsel may also allege flagrant disregard of a warrant if 
agents transgress the strategy described in the warrant.”247 
Despite the particularity problems of “best practices” computer searches, a number of 
federal courts have upheld such searches. For example, in United States v. Campos,248 the Tenth 
Circuit upheld the seizure of a defendant’s computer hardware and the subsequent off-site search 
of all its data for child pornography.249  The defendant argued that the search of his entire 
computer constituted a general search, but the court concluded that the search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the warrant was sufficiently particular in that it authorized a search 
for “items relating to child pornography.”250 
Similarly, in United States v. Lacy,251 the defendant argued that a warrant authorizing the 
seizure of all his computer equipment was “too general.”252 The Ninth Circuit found that the 
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 warrant “contained objective limits to help officers determine which items they could seize”253 
because the warrant authorized agents to seize only the data that was linked to a Danish 
computer system.254 Although the warrant “described the computer equipment itself in generic 
terms and subjected it to blanket seizure,” the court found such a description and seizure justified 
because “a Customs agent [had] explained [that] there was no way to specify what hardware and 
software had to be seized….”255 
In United States v.  Scott-Emuakpor,256 the court found that the police did not flagrantly 
disregard a warrant by seizing computer hardware and data that were not specifically described 
in the warrant.257 The court also found that the seizure of those items did not amount to a 
prohibited general search.258 The seizure of items not listed in the warrant was justified because 
“agents had no way of knowing whether [the evidence] would be found on computer hard drives 
or on zip disks; nor did they know the format in which those files might be stored.” 259 
Furthermore, the seizure of those items for an off-site search was “reasonable because it allowed 
the agents to preserve the computer system as it existed for the computer analysts, who were not 
present during the search….”260 
d. New Rules for Computer Searches? 
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 The judicial sanctioning of “best practices” computer searches has encroached on the 
penumbra of protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. This has led Professor Orin Kerr to 
conclude that existing Fourth Amendment rules that first found life and application in the 
physical world sometime “permit extraordinarily invasive government powers to go unregulated 
in some contexts.”261 Hence, Professor Kerr argues that the new methods of gathering digital 
evidence trigger a need for new legal standards and “rules of criminal procedure that restore the 
function of the old rules given the new facts.”262 
Kerr compiles a list of traditional rules that are problematic when applied to computer 
searches. First, “the traditional rule [that investigators cannot seize property beyond the scope of 
probable cause] requires a level of surgical precision and expertise that is possible for physical 
evidence but not digital evidence.”263 Second, Kerr avers that under traditional rules, making a 
copy of computer files is not a “seizure” and analyzing that copy is not a “search.”264 “Because 
police can create a perfect copy of the evidence without depriving the suspect of property, the 
new facts unhinge the rule from its traditional function of limiting police investigations.”265 
Third, the particularity requirement fails to limit government intrusion in computer searches. 
“Given how much information can be stored in a small computer hard drive, the particularity 
requirement no longer serves the function in electronic evidence cases that it serves in physical 
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 evidence cases.”266 Next, the rule that allows investigators executing a warrant to look in any 
place where evidence described in the warrant could conceivably be located “imposes a 
substantial limit for physical searches, but not for searches for electronic evidence,” because 
electronic evidence could be located anywhere on a hard drive.267 Finally, Kerr argues that the 
plain view exception under existing law effectively makes all computer searches general 
searches. 268  Under Horton v. California, 269  if evidence is found in plain view during an 
objectively justifiable search, then that evidence is admissible.270 The search of an entire hard 
drive is almost always objectively justifiable because electronic evidence could be located 
anywhere on the hard drive.271 
Kerr notes that courts have sometimes recognized those problems with existing Fourth 
Amendment rules and have crafted new rules because computer searches have been found to be 
“special,”272 “unique,”273 or “different.”274 On the one hand, many of the new rules serve to 
sanction “best practices” computer searches. For instance, one newly “ossified”275 rule is that “[a] 
valid warrant entitles investigators to seize computers and search them off-site at a later date.”276 
On the other hand, some of the new rules seek to offer Fourth Amendment protections where 
traditional rules have failed to do so. For example, requiring the inclusion of a “search strategy” 
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 in a warrant is a new rule that seeks to restore the particularity requirement in computer 
searches. 277  In addition, courts have – contrary to the holding of Horton – looked to the 
subjective intent of an officer to give meaning to the plain view exception in the computer 
context.278 
Kerr argues that the creation of new rules for computer searches should continue in order 
to address the Fourth Amendment problems of computer searches –  the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure should be amended, Congress should pass new laws and courts should 
implement new rules.279 Furthermore, Kerr asserts that the changes must be “institutional” and 
not merely incremental.280 For example, Kerr suggests that the plain view exception to computer 
searches could be abolished to prevent de facto general warrants in computer searches.281 Small 
changes, such as requiring greater specificity in computer search warrants, will fail to restore the 
“lost functionality” of Fourth Amendment rules.282 
Kerr declares that traditional Fourth Amendment rules, which germinated in the physical 
world, require law enforcement to undertake steps that are not possible283 or “impractical”284 in 
the computer world. Kerr’s solution is to create new institutional rules. In suggesting such a 
solution, Kerr does not consider whether the way computers are searched should change; instead, 
he assumes that the constitutional and other legal rules that govern such searches should change. 
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(suppressing child pornography evidence because the officer’s subjective intent showed that he had changed the 
scope of the search from narcotics evidence to child pornography) and United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 
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 Thus, his arguments are based on the assumption that the only way to seize and search electronic 
evidence is by following current computer forensic “best practices.” Kerr is tacitly agreeing with 
law enforcement that the only methods available are those methods that are currently in 
widespread use. 
Kerr demonstrates that the rules of criminal procedure are “organic” and have changed, 
and will continue to change, based upon new factual situations.285 Accordingly, institutional 
changes may be required. However, until such changes are implemented, law enforcement, 
defendants, attorneys and trial courts have little guidance in determining how to balance 
governmental and privacy interests in the area of computer searches.  In addition to any long-
term modifications to, and growth in, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there is a relatively 
simple solution to computer search problems that can be implemented immediately –  instead of 
changing the law to follow forensic examination practices, such practices could change to accord 
with the law. This will require judges and defense attorneys to challenge law enforcement to 
work harder to use computer forensic examination methods that respect Fourth Amendment 
rights. Such methods in the end may require few new legal standards or rules of criminal 
procedure. 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT COMPUTER FORENSIC “BEST PRACTICES” 
 
a. Do We Need Acquisition, Authentication, and Analysis as We Know It? 
 
Accepted computer examination principles and methodologies drive how warrant 
applications are drafted and reviewed and “considerations of practicality” justify law 
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 Kerr, supra note 261, at 281. “Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of 
standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some 
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 enforcement actions in computer searches. 286  There are, however, available alternatives to 
current computer forensic “best practices.” This part offers some concrete proposals for 
modifications to current computer forensic methodologies. Specifically, this part discusses 
alternatives that address overly broad computer searches and particularity problems in computer 
search warrants.287  
There is a technological reality that is overlooked when drafting “best practices” warrants 
– on-site searches of computer data are not difficult and time-consuming anymore. Perhaps at 
one time, in the early days of computing, such searches were fraught with difficulties, such as 
slow hardware and unstable software. And although computers continue to be imperfect in many 
ways, and in comparison with the operation of other consumer electronics, PCs have evolved and 
improved since the days of black screens, green characters and clock speeds measured in the 
single-digits.288 Today, searching for relevant data on a computer hard drive is highly efficient 
compared to, for instance, searching for a physical document in a file cabinet.289 In some cases a 
physical document may be found quickly, but physical searches for documents are ultimately 
slower, more difficult and complicated than similar searches for electronic data.290 Consider the 
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 For example, 4.77 MHz was the clock speed of the CPU in the first PC, which was introduced on August 12, 
1981 by International Business Machines (“IBM”). MUELLER, supra note 21, at 23. Clock speed is the measurement 
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CPU is about one half of that at 0.67 nanoseconds. Id. at 412-13. Overall, a 1.5 GHz Pentium IV-based PC is nearly 
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 See Resseguie, supra note 210, at 209-10 (“[S]earching for relevant documents on a computer hard drive, with 
the aid of search engines and utility programs, may actually be more efficient than manually searching through a 
large paper file cabinet unaided by technology.”). 
290
 Thus, case law that supports off-site searches of paper documents on grounds of practicality is mostly 
 ease with which the entire internet is searched from a single PC located in a home –  type in a 
few carefully chosen words about a given subject in a search engine, hit the enter key and a set of 
links to relevant web pages is promptly displayed. If a particular web page is viewed, then the 
contents of that page can be searched quickly and easily using a web browser’s find function.291 
In the case of computer forensics, searches for electronic data are now aided by forensic 
software packages such as EnCase.292  Such software can be used to search efficiently and 
effectively for possible evidence on-site.293  In particular, forensic software can identify and 
separate known data through file hashing and can classify unknown data by file type. 294 
Concerns about missed evidence because of changed file extensions or misleading file names are 
unfounded when using such software, because the software interrogates the data directly and 
looks to metadata, such as file headers, to determine file types and contents.295 Thus, there is no 
need for a warrant to authorize law enforcement to look at all data on a storage device when 
searching for evidentiary data –  law enforcement need only search classes of data that are 
                                                                                                                                                             
inapplicable to the computer context. See United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that there was no flagrant disregard because the “wholesale seizure of file cabinets and miscellaneous papers . . . . 
was motivated by the impracticability of on-site sorting and the time constraints of executing a daytime search 
warrant”); Crooker v. Mulligan, 788 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting cases “upholding the seizure of 
documents, both incriminating and innocuous, which are not specified in a warrant but are intermingled, in a single 
unit, with relevant documents”); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that a 
suppression motion was properly denied “where the Government’s wholesale seizures were motivated by 
considerations of practicality rather than by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing’”); United States v. Hillyard, 
677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[i]f commingling prevents on-site inspection, and no other 
practical alternative exists, the entire property may be seizable, at least temporarily”). 
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compared to a corresponding search through printed versions of Webster’s dictionary, the Oxford English 
Dictionary, and Roget’s Thesaurus. 
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 relevant to the investigation.296  For instance, in a child pornography case, a warrant could 
authorize a forensic examiner to search through data with image file headers, but not through 
data with text document headers. 
In light of the technological realities of computing today, in particular the celerity and 
accuracy with which computer data can be searched using forensic software tools, law 
enforcement claims that on-site searches for digital evidence are overly time-consuming and 
impractical are disingenuous at best. 297  Thus, in applicable circumstances, warrants should 
authorize on-site computer searches only. Clearly, such searches can be conducted with a 
minimal risk of missed evidence and in a timely manner using readily available software tools. 
Because on-site searches are feasible, computer search warrants should, instead of 
authorizing the seizure of hardware for an off-site search, authorize the seizure of only the 
relevant electronic data found on the hardware, unless the hardware itself is contraband, evidence 
or an instrumentality or fruit of a crime.298 In practice, the only way to seize a subset of data on a 
storage device is to copy that data. Accordingly, such warrants should authorize the copying of 
only the data that is relevant to the investigation.299 Despite law enforcement claims to the 
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 Law enforcement typically seeks to copy an entire hard drive. One reason given for such a request is that the 
 contrary, there is no need to seize the original data (which results in the seizure of storage 
devices and all the data contained therein), because copies of electronic data can be authenticated 
using individual file hashing.300 Individual file hashing can thus be used to show the accuracy of 
electronic copies for evidentiary purposes.301  Moreover, accurate duplicates and printouts of 
electronic data are admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.302 
In sum, a new “best practices” search warrant should authorize the on-site search for a 
particular class or classes of data, and seizures of only the data that is relevant to the crime being 
investigated. In doing so, the warrant would respect Fourth Amendment rights while authorizing 
effective law enforcement activities that are technologically possible and practicable. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the physical world, Fourth Amendment standards are easily applied. A neutral and 
detached magistrate finds probable cause and issues a search warrant describing in detail the 
place to be searched. For instance, a search warrant may authorize a police officer to search for 
controlled substances in a person’s home at a certain time. The officer may not seize the entire 
contents of the home, carry them away and then search through them at his leisure. His search is 
                                                                                                                                                             
mirror image will allow a forensic examiner to inspect the data without altering the original. See supra Part III.a for 
some other reasons in support of for disk imaging; see also CASEY, supra note 6, at 226 (“[A]lways make at least 
two copies of digital evidence”); CYBERCRIME, supra note 86, at 106 (“[A]lways make a mirror image”); TAYLOR, 
supra note 7, at 309 (“With any seized system, it is important to create a working copy for forensic analysis”). 
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lab, the analysis of the bloodstains may alter them. Such changes to the evidence are accepted as a part of the 
forensic examination process and are, a fortiori, a primary consideration when deciding the order in which various 
analyses should be done. 
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 FED. R. EVID. 1001, 1003. “If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output 
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10-2 (“A copy of a writing, recording or photograph is admissible to the same extent as an original ….”). 
 
 limited by the contents of the warrant. 
In the computer context, however, the particularity requirement has seemingly been 
abandoned. Search warrants for computers could be likened to the general warrants and writs of 
assistance that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment was intended to eliminate. 
Under current “best practices,” computers (which can store massive amounts of data) are seized, 
taken off site and then rummaged through by forensic examiners. On-site searches for particular 
computer files are too “complicated” 303 and may take “days or weeks.”304 The needs of law 
enforcement –  and not Fourth Amendment rights – control the content of warrants. 
This state of affairs has been accepted, or at least tolerated, because computer searches 
are seen as “special.”  In many ways, the computer world is unlike the physical one. As a result, 
courts have struggled to apply to the computer world Fourth Amendment law that was developed 
from cases in the physical world. One solution is to create new Fourth Amendment rules for 
computer searches. Alternatively, law enforcement could use methods that comport with the 
Fourth Amendment and current technology allows law enforcement to do so. The details of the 
accepted trilogy of acquisition, authentication and analysis could be reworked in favor of 
preserving Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the forensic examination of computers would follow 
from the law, and not vice versa. 
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